### Georgia Code of Prosecuting Attorneys' Conduct Preamble

[1] In the criminal justice system, the prosecutor is an independent minister of justice. The Georgia Constitution, unlike the federal system, assigns the prosecutorial function to the judicial branch of government. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the representation and presentation of the truth. This responsibility includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that the guilty are held accountable, that the innocent are protected from unwarranted harm, and that the rights of all participants, particularly victims of crime, are respected.

A prosecutor should zealously protect the rights of individuals, but without representing any individual as a client. A prosecutor should put the rights and interests of society in a paramount position in exercising prosecutorial discretion in individual cases. A prosecutor should seek to reform criminal laws whenever it is appropriate and necessary to do so. Societal interests rather than individual or group interests should also be paramount in a prosecutor's efforts to seek reform of criminal laws. A prosecutor shall not be influenced by fear, favor, or affection. Nor shall the race, gender, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or other such trait of an individual affect their decisions unless relevant to an element of an offense.

[2] The Georgia Code of Prosecuting Attorneys' Conduct establishes standards for the Prosecuting Attorneys' Qualifications Commission regarding the duties of commissioned district attorneys and solicitors-general. Neither the Preamble and Scope nor the Commentary is intended as a statement of additional Rules. When the text uses "shall" or "shall not," it is intended to impose binding obligations the violation of which are grounds for disciplinary action. When "should" or "should not" is used, the text is intended as an advisory statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct, and the violation of which may be grounds for disciplinary action. When "may" is used, it denotes permissible discretion or, depending on the context, it refers to action that is not covered by specific proscriptions.

### $\mathbf{Scope}$

The Georgia Code of Prosecuting Attorneys' Conduct is not intended as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of prosecuting attorneys. They should also be governed in their professional and personal conduct by general ethical standards. Prosecuting attorneys should strive to achieve the highest ethical standards, even if not required by this Code. The mandatory provisions of the Code describe the basic minimal professional requirements that should govern the behavior of all commissioned prosecuting attorneys and provide guidance to assist them in establishing and maintaining high standards of professional and personal conduct.

The Code should be applied as rules of reason consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional law, including formal advisory opinions issued by the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission, as well as in the context of all relevant circumstances. The Code is to be construed so as not to impinge on the essential *independence* of prosecuting attorneys in making prosecutorial decisions, or on prosecuting attorneys' First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association.

The Code is intended to govern conduct of commissioned prosecuting attorneys, and in certain circumstances to be binding upon them. It is not intended, however, that every transgression will result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should depend on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of improper activity, and the effect of the improper activity on others or on the judicial system.

The Code is designed to provide guidance to commissioned prosecuting attorneys and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualifications Commission. It is not designed for nor intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. It is not intended to be the basis for litigants to seek collateral remedies against each other or to obtain tactical advantages in proceedings before a court.

In accordance with O.C.G.A. § 15-18-32(o), the Code is limited to matters of incapacity or discipline of a district attorney or solicitor-general as holder of such office. Nothing in this Code shall be construed as diminishing the authority of the Supreme Court or the State Bar of Georgia to regulate the practice of law in this state. A complaint alleging a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which are applicable to all attorneys, shall not be a violation of this Code.

Alleged violations of ethical rules that would be generally applicable to attorneys do not violate this Code.

### **Terminology**

This Code hereby adopts the definitions used in the Rules of the Prosecuting Attorneys Qualification Commission.

#### Rules

### Rule 1. Primary Duty of the Prosecuting Attorney

The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict. The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor should seek to protect the innocent and convict the guilty, consider the interests of victims and witnesses, and respect the constitutional and legal rights of all persons, including suspects and defendants.

### Rule 2. Ethical obligations of prosecuting attorneys.

The district attorney and solicitor-general should know and abide by the standards of professional conduct as expressed in applicable Georgia law and the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 3.8, and published opinions in the appellate courts of this state. The district attorney and solicitor-general should make use of ethical guidance offered by the State Bar of Georgia.

### Rule 3. Filing of criminal charges

- a) District attorneys and solicitors-general should seek or file criminal charges only if they reasonably believe that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice.
- b) After criminal charges are filed, a district attorney or solicitorgeneral should maintain them only if they continue to reasonably believe that probable cause exists and that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
- c) A district attorney or solicitor-general should not file or maintain charges if he or she believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the evidence.

### Rule 4. Prosecutorial Discretion

- (a) In order to fully implement their functions and duties, including the obligation to enforce the law while exercising sound discretion, district attorneys and solicitors-general are not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support. Among the factors which the district attorney or solicitor-general may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a criminal charge, even though it meets the requirements of Rule 3 (a), are:
  - (1) the strength of the case;
  - (2) the prosecutor's doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
  - (3) the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense;
  - (4) the impact of prosecution or non-prosecution on the public welfare;
  - (5) the background and characteristics of the offender, including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation;
  - (6) whether the authorized or likely punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the offender;
  - (7) the views and motives of the victim or complainant;
  - (8) any improper conduct by law enforcement;
- 150 (9) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons;

- (10) potential collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims;
  - (11) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others;
  - (12) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other improper biases;
  - (13) changes in law or policy;

- (14) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;
- (15) the likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and
- (16) whether the public's interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.
- (b) A district attorney or solicitor-general shall not be subject to discipline for the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as provided for in this rule and elsewhere throughout the Code.

Commentary - Broadly defined, the term "prosecutorial discretion" refers to the soup-to-nuts entirety of "[a] prosecutor's power to choose from the options available in a criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining, and recommending a sentence to the court." Prosecutorial Discretion, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The core of prosecutorial discretion, though—its essence—is the decision whether or not to charge an individual with a criminal offense in the first place. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle—which dates back centuries—that "the [Judicial] Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case." See generally *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 196 (1869)).

## Rule 5. Discipline, removal, and involuntary retirement of prosecuting attorneys

### Rule 5.1 Incapacity

(a) Incapacity means a permanent or persistent mental or physical condition that precludes, prevents, or prohibits a district attorney or solicitor-general from performance of their proscribed duties as

- a direct consequence of its severity. Incapacity is distinguished from a disability that does not adversely affect a district attorney or solicitor-general's performance of prosecutorial functions, or that does so only on a temporary basis.
- (b) A district attorney or solicitor-general may be removed from office, subject to involuntary retirement, or placed on incapacity inactive status if found to be suffering from incapacity.

#### Rule 5.2. Willful Misconduct

- (a) Willful misconduct means the performance of a prosecutorial action by a district attorney or solicitor-general in bad faith. Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. See *Inquiry Concerning Judge Coomer*, 315 Ga. 841, 860 (2023.) Willful misconduct may include, but is not limited to:
  - (1) The commission of a felony or crime of moral turpitude;
  - (2) Successful introduction of inadmissible evidence with total disregard for its inadmissibility (see generally *Flowers v. State*, 842 So. 2d 531 (2003);
  - (3) Intentional inducement of a mistrial for the purpose of securing an opportunity to retry a case (see *Roscoe v. State*, 286 Ga. 325, 326 (2009));
  - (4) Purposeful, sustained pursuit of an extended course of conduct designed to:
    - i deprive a defendant of criminal due process; or
    - ii. deprive a defendant of a fair trial (see Order 06DHC35) before the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar https://www.ncbar.gov/orders/06dhc35.pdf);
  - (5) Presentation of testimony from a witness with actual knowledge that the testimony is false while asserting that said testimony is truthful (see generally *Mondy v. State*, 229 Ga. App. 311 (1997));
  - (6) Invention, development, fabrication, creation, or manufacture of facts or items with the intent to utilize it or them as evidence of the commission of a crime by a

defendant or defendant(s) (see *Greene v. State*, 303 Ga. 184 (2018));

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- (7) Knowingly using the power of authority of his or her office to intentionally participate in or facilitate violations of criminal law (see generally O.C.G.A. § 16-10-1, et seq. and O.C.G.A. § 16-10-90, et seq.; see also *In the Matter of Mark Preston Jones*, Supreme Court of Georgia, S22Y0606 (2022));
- (8) Collection or attempted collection of evidence with purposeful disregard for clearly known and well-established procedural requirements.
- (b) A prosecuting attorney may be subject to discipline if found to have committed willful misconduct in office.
- (c) No district attorney or solicitor-general shall be subject to discipline pursuant to this rule when there exists a colorable argument that the alleged willful misconduct was based upon the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as provided in Rule 4.

Commentary - Much like judicial discipline, elected prosecutorial discipline should have equitable considerations as discussed in Coomer. There, the cited constitutional basis for discipline was "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice," to the extent that it involved "actions taken in bad faith by a judge acting outside [his] judicial capacity." Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 94-70, 265 Ga. at 328 (1). Actions taken in bad faith must involve something more than mere negligence. See State v. Bryant, 307 Ga. 850, 854 (2) (838 SE2d 855) (2020) ("Inherent in the concept of bad faith is something more than negligence."); see also Greenway v. Hamilton, 280 Ga. 652, 655 (3) (631 SE2d 689) (2006) (noting in attorney fee context that "[b]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but a breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will" (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Wachovia Bank of Ga., N.A. v. Namik, 275 Ga. App. 229, 234 (3) (b) (620 SE2d 470) (2005) ("Bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest or ill will." (punctuation and footnote omitted)). Coomer, 315 Ga. at 860, 885 S.E.2d at 754 (2023). The reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion should not be

questioned in hindsight, even if a different decision would also have been

defensible. See *Hughes v. State*, 296 Ga. 744 (2016), holding that a finding of probable cause is still valid, even when an alternative explanation exists. See also *State v. Henderson*, 271 Ga. 264 (1999), holding that a decision by a magistrate to issue a search warrant should be afforded substantial deference by a reviewing court.

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### Rule 5.3. Willful and Persistent Failure to Carry Out Duties

- (a) A district attorney or solicitor-general shall carry out all duties specified in Code Section 15-18-6 or Code Section 15-18-66 as applicable. However, a district attorney or solicitor-general shall be deemed to have performed his or her duties pursuant to Code Section 15-18-6(4) and 15-18-66(b)(1) when:
  - (1) he or she has assigned an assistant district attorney or assistant solicitor-general to review cases under his or her authority; or
  - (2) he or she has established a review procedure for all cases.
- (b) A district attorney or solicitor-general may be subject to discipline if found to have willfully and persistently failed to carry out the duties provided for in subsection (a) of this rule.
- (c) No district attorney or solicitor-general shall be subject to discipline pursuant to this rule when there exists a colorable argument that the alleged willful and persistent failure to carry out duties was based upon the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as provided in Rule 4.

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### Rule 5.4. Conviction of A Crime of Moral Turpitude

- (a) A crime of moral turpitude means any felony or crime involving dishonesty, as defined or interpreted by Georgia law.
- (b) As used in this rule, the term "convicted" shall include a finding or a verdict of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding, regardless of whether the adjudication of guilt or sentence is withheld or not entered thereon. It shall not include any deferred prosecution or pre-trial diversion agreement.
- (c) A district attorney or solicitor-general may be subject to discipline if found to have been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.

### Rule 5.5. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice Which Brings the Office Into Disrepute

- (a) "Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" refers "to inappropriate actions taken in good faith by the prosecuting attorney acting in their prosecutorial capacity, but which may appear to be unprofessional and harmful to the public's esteem for the office." See *In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge*, 265 Ga 843, 844 n.2, 462 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1995).
- (b) For the purpose of this Rule, "disrepute" means a general feeling of low regard or disfavor by the general public. Differences of opinion over the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, best practices regarding utilization of resources, and political ideology shall not be treated as bringing an office into disrepute.
- (c) A district attorney or solicitor-general may be subject to discipline for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute.
- (d) No district attorney or solicitor-general shall be subject to discipline pursuant to this Rule when there exists a colorable argument that the alleged conduct was based upon the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as provided in Rule 4.

## Rule 5.6. Conduct of assistant district attorneys or assistant solicitors-general

- (a) A district attorney or solicitor-general may be subject to discipline for knowingly authorizing or permitting an assistant or assistant solicitor-general to commit any act which would violate Rules 5.1 through 5.5.
- (b) No district attorney or solicitor-general shall be subject to discipline pursuant to this rule when there exists a colorable argument that the alleged conduct was based upon the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion as provided in Rule 4.

### Rule 6. Prosecuting attorney not subject to discipline; exceptions Rule 6.1. Conduct not subject to discipline

No district attorney or solicitor-general shall be subject to discipline based upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion concerning a charging decision, plea offer, opposition to or grant of a continuance, placement of a case on a trial calendar, or recommendation regarding bond.

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### Rule 6.2. Conduct which may be the basis for discipline

Rule 6.1 shall not apply when affidavits and any documents attached to a sworn complaint against a district attorney or solicitor-general show it is plausible that discretion exercised under Rule 4 was affected by:

- (a) Undue bias or prejudice against the accused or in favor of persons with interests adverse to the accused;
- (b) An undisclosed financial interest in the outcome of the prosecution;
- (c) An undisclosed conflict of interest;
- (d) Factors that are completely unrelated to the duties of prosecution; or
- (e) A stated policy, written or otherwise, which demonstrates that the district attorney or solicitor general categorically refuses to prosecute any offense or offenses of which he or she is required by law to prosecute.

Commentary – A categorical refusal to prosecute an offense does not occur when a district attorney or solicitor-general prioritizes the prosecution of certain offenses above others, promotes judicial economy, or treats certain offenses more or less harshly than others as a matter of policy. This Rule is not intended to limit the protected political speech of an incumbent running for re-election or other office. It refers to a policy where a district attorney or solicitor-general commits in advance to a refusal to prosecute an offense or offenses which they are required to prosecute and have the resources and/or ability to prosecute, regardless of the strength of the evidence or egregiousness of the underlying conduct. Review of allegations that involve a decision to prosecute an accused should consider the full record, including any results of hearings, trials, and appeals that have taken place.

#### Rule 6.3 Prosecutorial Discretion

Any consideration of Rule 6.2 shall consider whether there exists a colorable argument that the district attorney or solicitor-general

has properly exercised prosecutorial discretion as provided for in Rule 4.

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